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A Conference on Housing, Stability, and the Macroeconomy: 
International Perspectives 
 
This article provides an introduction to the JMCB special issue on housing bubbles, the 
global financial crisis and the ensuing recessions in countries that experienced housing busts. 
We focus on five themes that are important for policymakers and researchers alike: the 
domestic and international factors driving housing booms and busts, the relevance of the 
housing sector for the real economy, how monetary policy should react to housing booms 
and busts, how housing and mortgage finance reform could affect financial stability, and the 
broad lessons learned for macroeconomics and macroprudential policy. 
JEL codes: E30, E50, R30, R21, G10 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the housing-related recessions that followed the global financial crisis, 
there has been renewed interest in understanding the linkages between housing, macroeconomic 
activity, and financial stability.  This special issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
examines these issues and provides international perspectives. These pages present the 
proceedings of a conference on Housing, Stability, and the Macroeconomy: International 
Perspectives, held in Dallas on November 14-15, 2013. The conference was sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the International Monetary Fund, and the Center for Banking 
Excellence at the University of Kansas. 
The recessions that followed the housing-triggered global financial crisis tended to be 
initially deeper in countries that had experienced earlier housing booms and were exacerbated by 
housing busts.  Consequently, there has been renewed interest in understanding the linkages 
between housing, macroeconomic activity and financial stability, centering on several sets of 
research questions.  To what extent did house price expectations, sentiment, and credit standards 
drive booms and busts?  How did international capital flows induce or propagate these housing 
market swings and how did these roles differ across advanced and emerging economies? To what 
degree were the ensuing recessions in some countries (e.g., the U.S., UK, Spain and Ireland) 
exacerbated by the direct effects of house prices on construction and consumption and/or by 
indirect debt overhang and foreclosure effects on credit availability and household spending?  
Answers to these and related questions will help inform the ongoing policy debate.  In the 
near term, how (if at all) should monetary policy take into account or be adjusted for large 
swings in housing market activity?  How should countries reform their mortgage finance and 
housing policies to improve macro-stability in an efficient and cost-beneficial way?  What 
lessons have we learned from the housing-related global financial crisis and what housing 
patterns and issues will likely emerge or prevail in the future? 
The remainder of this introductory article reviews the proceedings of the conference and 
summarizes many of the most salient points and arguments made there.  Section 2 describes 
domestic and international factors that drive housing booms and busts. Section 3 discusses some 
3	
	
consequences of housing booms and busts.  Section 4 gives an overview of different policy 
reforms currently being discussed. Section 5 concludes and looks forward. 
 
2. WHAT DRIVES HOUSING BOOMS AND BUSTS? 
One group of conference papers and commentaries focuses squarely on the factors that 
have driven housing booms and busts across countries.  Muellbauer (2015) discusses what drives 
house prices and how one can account for the remarkable diversity of international experience, 
which is not well explained by the usual suspects such as incomes, interest rates, demographics, 
etc. Muellbauer argues that the diversity can only be explained by taking changing mortgage 
lending standards into account. 
Wachter’s (2015) viewpoint is somewhat different. In a comparison of Europe and the 
U.S., Wachter notes how financial markets funded mortgages in countries experiencing housing 
booms and busts.  She stresses how the originate-to-distribute system of securitization, which 
shifted much default risk away from loan originators, has been blamed for the recent housing 
bust in the U.S., but that this cannot explain the recent housing swings in several bank-centric 
European countries, where loan originators retained the first loss from default risk under one of 
two finance systems.  The main source of funding new mortgages in countries such as Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark was covered bonds versus short-term wholesale funding in Ireland 
and the UK.  Wachter argues that the common culprit across the financial market-funded booms 
and busts in the U.S. and Europe was over-optimism on the part of homebuyers that pushed up 
house prices in thinly traded markets.  Prices, in turn, were mistakenly treated as correctly 
indicating the value of housing collateral by lenders and investors, who granted more credit, 
which amplified the initial rise in house prices.  
The study by Ling, Ooi, and Lee (2015) focuses on how the sentiments of lenders, 
mortgage borrowers and home builders interact and affect house prices.  After orthogonalizing 
separate measures of lender, borrower and builder sentiment against economic fundamentals, 
they find the common, remaining “nonfundamental” component across these measures 
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significantly affects house prices. They also find evidence that past house price movements 
predict both the future non-fundamental component of sentiment and future house prices.  These 
findings, as noted by Lansing (2015), provide evidence consistent with the view (most 
prominently, of Shiller (2005)) that house prices feedback onto sentiment and that household 
views of future house prices arise from non-rational or adaptive expectations formation.  As 
Lansing emphasizes, these results raise concerns that the feedback loops and spirals set off by 
sentiment may be masked by simple aggregate loan-to-value ratios, which are misleading 
because of their endogeneity, consistent with points made by Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy 
(2011).   From a broader perspective, Ling, Ooi, and Lee go beyond the earlier work of Shiller 
(2005), Case, Shiller, and Thompson (2012) and Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino (2013) and 
especially contribute to the literature by showing how the dynamic feedbacks among the 
sentiment of these three key types of agents and house prices can amplify the initial effects of 
changes in sentiment and give rise to persistent swings in house prices. 
Three conference papers examine the role of international capital flows in housing booms 
and busts. As noted earlier, a number of advanced and emerging markets experienced strong 
booms in house prices over the 2000s. The papers explore different facets of the role that global 
liquidity may have played in generating these booms. The paper by Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes and 
Rebucci (2015) looks at the contribution of an increase in the worldwide supply of bank credit to 
house price booms in emerging markets. The authors find that the response of house prices in a 
representative emerging market economy to an innovation in global bank credit is five times the 
size it is in advanced economies. In his discussion, Kuttner (2015) notes that the extensive data 
set put together by the authors could be used in future studies to explain disparities among 
countries in the response of house prices to global liquidity shocks. For example, why did 
Estonia experience a four-fold increase in house prices followed by a collapse when lending 
retrenched, whereas prices in Switzerland took off only after the global bust and prices in Canada 
remained largely untouched by the pullback in cross-border lending? 
Sá and Wiedalek (2015) study the extent to which house price dynamics in the United 
States have been influenced by capital flows from the rest of the world. They use a structural 
vector autoregression with sign restrictions to identify the effect of these flows. Their variance 
decompositions suggest that such flows may have accounted for 7 to 10 percent of U.S. 
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residential investment and house prices. This suggests, as noted by Gete (2015), that while 
capital flows did play some role, there is ample room left for other explanations of the U.S. 
boom-bust cycle, including ‘loose’ monetary policy (generally described as a deviation by the 
Fed from a Taylor Rule during 2004-06).  
The paper by Fererro (2015), on the other hand, argues that monetary factors played only 
a minor role in driving the U.S. housing boom. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model, the paper demonstrates that credit and preference shocks can generate the house 
price booms of the sort experienced in the 2000s, as well as a substantial part of the increase in 
U.S. current account deficits. However, these shocks put upward pressure on real interest rates, 
contrary to what was observed. Fererro shows that a combination of expansionary monetary 
policy in the U.S. and a regime of managed exchange rates in the rest of the world can account 
for low global real interest rates; however, credit and preference shocks remain the main driver 
of house price and current account dynamics. Leamer (2015b) expresses some skepticism about 
these conclusions. He notes that the DSGE model is estimated from historical correlations, which 
may not have been a reliable guide to what might have happened if the Fed had tightened in 
2003-06; in particular, since many more mortgages were tied to short-term interest rates than in 
the historical data, a Fed tightening may have cooled off housing markets more so than in the 
past. Leamer also argues that some of the credit and preference shocks in Fererro’s analysis may 
themselves have been the result of the low interest rate policy of the Fed; the low teaser rates of 
subprime mortgages, for instance, were tied to the low federal funds rate. 
 
3. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF HOUSING BOOMS AND BUSTS 
Housing, credit and consumption booms tend to go hand in hand, especially when lending 
standards are relaxed and financial innovations alter the collateral role of housing.  In countries 
with more stable credit standards, any overshooting of construction and house prices owes more 
to traditional housing supply and demand factors. Muellbauer (2014) discusses the three 
potential links between housing, credit and the financial accelerator – the consumption channel, 
6	
	
the investment channel and the feedback between bad loans and risk spreads via the financial 
system. 
During a housing bust, construction collapses, consumption slumps and the incidence of 
negative equity, mortgage delinquency and foreclosure all increase. House prices undershoot 
their long run fundamental values. Households, firms and financial institutions are forced to de-
lever and repair their balance sheets. The resulting balance sheet recessions tend to last longer 
than other recessions, since deleveraging is inevitably a slow process. The recent U.S. subprime 
crisis demonstrates the importance of understanding housing markets, financial innovation, 
changes in regulation, and global financial imbalances. A U.S. housing crisis, involving 
relatively moderate subprime losses, quickly turned into a financial crisis that spread globally, 
culminating in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In retrospect, the economic and social 
consequences of the subprime boom were dire. 
As Muellbauer (2015) notes, housing collateral (“wealth”) effects vary by country and over 
time with financial liberalization and financial innovations. Housing collateral effects work 
through some combination of changes in mortgage debt (e.g., lower down payments, more cash 
out refinances, more home equity lines of credit) and changes in consumer debt (e.g. more auto 
loans, higher credit card balances, more student loans). Savvy, unconstrained households are also 
likely to substitute cheaper debt, such as home equity lines of credits, for more expensive debt, 
such as credit card balances. 
Brown, Stein and Zafir (2015) investigate these effects using individual credit report data for 
the U.S.  They model the relationship between changes in house prices and changes in auto loan, 
credit card, student loan and home equity line of credit balances. They look at three different 
time periods – the pre-housing boom period (1999 to 2001), the boom (2002 to 2006) and the 
bust (2007 to 2012) - since the supply of credit likely differed in these periods. A range of 
individual and ZIP code level controls are included in their models and the change in house 
prices is instrumented, since imperfectly observed local demand conditions drive house prices 
and debt holdings. Ceteris paribus, the marginal propensity to hold home equity lines of credit in 
response to a change in house price is remarkably stable at about 4 percent (0.04) in the three 
periods.  As Pence (2015) notes, the pre-housing boom period provides support for the Brown et 
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al. substitution story – home equity line of credit balances increased dollar-for-dollar as credit 
card balances declined. The boom period provides support for both the collateral and substitution 
effects, although there is considerable heterogeneity in the results. Pence is particularly interested 
in the mechanisms underlying the collateral and substitution effects found in this study, and 
wonders to what degree the authors’ findings are robust to their methodological choices, such as 
classifying home owners and renters based on whether or not they had mortgage debt, and 
excluding home equity loans and cash out refinances from the analysis. 
Few models of the housing boom and bust successfully capture the joint dynamics of house 
prices and foreclosures in the U.S., especially during the 2006 to 2009 period when the inventory 
of foreclosed mortgages jumped from 1 to 4.3 percent and the index of real (CoreLogic) house 
prices fell by about 30 percent.  Arslan, Guler and Taskin (2015) try to capture these dynamics 
by incorporating a housing market, with a realistic tenure choice and mortgage structure, into a 
standard life-cycle incomplete markets model with idiosyncratic income and moving shocks. 
After calibrating the model to several long-term features of the U.S. housing market, they 
identify the types of macro shocks that are required to generate the large swings in house prices 
and foreclosures observed during the U.S. housing boom and bust. They focus on a combination 
of three shocks – a rise in the risk free rate from 2 to 3 percent, an increase in the minimum down 
payment requirement from 0 to 20 percent and an increase in the unemployment rate from 5 to 6 
percent. In their model, Arslan et al. also quantify the self-reinforcing feedbacks between falling 
house prices and rising foreclosures, and show that macroprudential policy – a higher minimum 
down payment – could significantly reduce the response of house prices and foreclosures to 
negative shocks.  In his discussion, Willen (2015) expresses doubt that any general equilibrium 
model can really explain the recent U.S. house price bust. In particular, he questions the realism 
and exogeneity of the three large unanticipated, permanent shocks in this model, especially the 
rise in the minimum down payment ratio from 0 to 20 percent. He suggests that the actual ratio 
only fell by about 3½ percent over this period (presumably, because the share of low down 
payment FHA originations jumped).  Willen believes that the housing bust was triggered by a 
sharp exogenous change in beliefs about future house price expectations – i.e., the collapse of a 
bubble – when overly optimistic expectations of continuing house price appreciation were 
replaced by overly pessimistic expectations of house price declines. 
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4. APPROPRIATE POLICIES TO ADDRESS THE RISK OF HOUSING 
BUBBLES 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 led by a collapse in the U.S. housing market gave 
many informed observers pause to rethink the appropriate policy responses to housing 
developments and also to reflect on the nature of the involvement of government agencies and 
banks in mortgage markets. In turn, this induced the advent of new regulatory tools, revised 
macroeconomic policy approaches, and a flurry of reform proposals. Some of the conference 
papers and remarks offer a window into the current state of this policy debate.   
In his opening remarks, Claessens (2015a) points to several policy challenges. First, should 
policymakers stop bubbles in the first place? Second, when is the right moment to take action?  
And how can a boom in process be stopped?  He points to fiscal, monetary and macro-prudential 
tools in this context, though all three have certain side effects and face practical challenges. 
Specifically, Claessens discusses the trade-off in applying supply- versus demand-side measures 
to contain a boom.  While supply side limits may be easier to implement, they face risks of 
circumventions and arbitrage. One additional problem in adopting supply-side measures is 
leakages coming from lending by foreign branches. On the other hand, demand limits may be 
harder to apply but can have the benefit of being more comprehensive at the individual 
household level.  
The pre-crisis thinking suggesting that monetary policy should not systematically respond to 
asset price fluctuations is based on the standard New Keynesian model with no explicit financial 
frictions. Building on the more recent literature, Notarpietro and Siviero (2015) assess the 
desirability of monetary policy responses to housing price changes in a New Keynesian model 
with a housing sector and financial frictions on the household side. In their model, the central 
bank is allowed to respond to housing price fluctuations, as well as to inflation and output 
growth. The main insight from their framework is that the optimal monetary policy response to 
housing price changes depends on the extent of financial frictions in the economy.  Specifically, 
monetary policy should only be used to counter rising housing prices if the loan-to-value ratio is 
sufficiently high. Their results suggest that modelling financial imperfections is crucial for the 
evaluation of policy rules. Liu (2015) points out, however, that Notarpietro and Siviero’s paper 
abstracts from fiscal policy instruments and that further research should explore the relative 
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effectiveness of monetary policy relative to fiscal policy for macroeconomic fluctuations driven 
by housing price shocks. Liu also points to the need for a better understanding of the appropriate 
design of both fiscal and monetary policies, an issue that other papers and remarks delve into. 
An important policy tool re-discovered in the aftermath of the crisis is macro-prudential 
policy, which has gained appeal with the realization that it is impossible to use one instrument 
(monetary policy) to target two objectives (price stability and financial risk taking), a point also 
made by Miles (2015). More targeted policy tools—in particular macro-prudential ones—could 
for example be used when the level of interest rates that is desirable to stabilize the wider 
economy is not the same as the rate that would stabilize housing markets. Miles points to several 
tools that can be used, both on the supply and the demand side. These include capital 
requirements on mortgage lending as well as limits to loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios. 
Nevertheless, monetary policy continues to be the line of last defense, according to Miles.  
Hartmann (2015) provides a systematic discussion of challenges associated with the 
implementation of macro-prudential policy solutions.  He shows that real estate price cycles 
during the recent boom and bust were not strongly correlated across countries, and emphasizes 
that to be effective, macro-prudential tools must be implemented in a flexible fashion that 
recognizes this granularity.  And holding these country-level differences constant, Hartmann 
additionally emphasizes the asymmetric politics of implementing macro-prudential tools across 
the business cycle, namely the headwinds that regulators will face when attempting slow the 
growth of credit access at a time when large numbers of less wealthy households could otherwise 
gain access to mortgage credit and home ownership.  But he has a generally sanguine view for 
the future efficacy of macro-prudential regulation, based on the information being generated by a 
large body of new research—some of which was presented at this conference—that uncovers 
what worked, and what did not work, across various countries during the boom, bust and crisis 
years.           
Vandenbussche, Vogel and Detragiache (2015) offer empirical evidence on the effectiveness 
of different macro-prudential tools, examining whether changes in macro-prudential policies 
across 16 countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe over the period 1997-2011 were 
associated with changes in housing prices. The authors find that some macro-prudential policies, 
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notably higher regulatory capital ratios and changes in the maximum ratio of household loans to 
capital, as well as two types of non-standard liquidity measures, had a significant correlation 
with house prices, while others (such as provisioning rules and reserve requirements) had no 
significant relationship.  Vandenbussche et al. also show that two of these four policies affect 
household credit growth, while the two others that are related to housing price growth are not 
related to credit growth.   
Vandenbussche et al. also makes significant contribution to this relatively recent literature by 
compiling a new dataset for a large number of countries and by systematically exploring the 
relationship between macro-prudential policies with asset price changes.  In his discussion of this 
paper, Beck (2015) points to these important contributions, but also notes several challenges, 
including the issue of endogeneity and understanding the channels through which macro-
prudential policies affect asset prices.  He sees the use of loan-level data as a promising way 
forward in tackling these challenges.  
Several contributors make suggestions on adjusting the current structure of mortgage 
contracts to reduce the fragility risks stemming from house price cycles.  Specifically, Jaffee 
(2015) discusses several possible adjustments to mortgage loan contracts (i) including provisions 
that automatically adjust loan balance and payments downward with declining house prices and 
(ii) mortgage loans with the option to convert into rental contracts, with the lender as home 
owner. Defining a proper house price index and detailing the exact contract terms seem the most 
important challenges in this context.   Similarly, Miles (2015) discusses different contract types 
that allow for risk sharing between lenders and borrowers, such as equity loans where repayment 
amounts vary with house prices. He sees different feasible alternatives, with asymmetric 
adjustments for up- and downward price movements.   He presents different models that show 
combinations of upside and downside participation (how much upside does borrower have to 
give up to insure against a certain percentage of downward price losses) for the same return on 
the loan.  Obviously, these are static comparisons that do not take into account that house price 
dynamics might change when different mortgage contracts are offered.  
Central to Miles’ proposal to fundamentally reduce leverage and housing market volatility is 
to encourage households to provide more equity and especially outside equity to finance house 
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purchases and, in turn, to rely less on debt.  There are however problems with outside equity. As 
pointed out by Claessens (2015a) and Crawford (2015) there are tax incentives to take on 
excessive debt, emanating from the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments.  This is still 
the case in many countries, including the U.S. and the Netherlands, while others, such as the UK, 
have moved away from it.  
Mortgage securitization is mentioned by several conference contributors. Jaffee (2015) points 
to the more widespread use of covered mortgage bonds rather than securitization in Europe, 
which implies keeping mortgages on banks’ balance sheets, therefore keeping banks in a first-
loss position. This is similar to the remarks made by Wachter (2015) referenced above. Forcing 
banks to retain a share of mortgages they securitize might yield some of the benefits of lower 
moral hazard associated with the issuance of covered bonds.  Related to this is the optimal role of 
government sponsored mortgage enterprises, especially in the U.S. where Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have long played a prominent, and controversial, role as credit suppliers in 
mortgage markets.  Jaffee (2015) advocates restricting their role to backstopping catastrophic 
risk if political reasons preclude shutting down these institutions.  
 
5. Lessons Learned and Looking Ahead 
 
The recent crisis offers some interesting conclusions when comparing the performance of 
different countries and relating it to housing policy frameworks in these countries. Crawford 
(2015) offers a very interesting comparison between the U.S. and Canada, pointing to several 
factors that have thus far prevented Canada from suffering a housing crisis.  First, the non-prime 
market is a much smaller share of the mortgage market in Canada (5 versus 20 percent of the 
overall market), with many of the exotic products used in the U.S. simply not being available in 
Canada.   Second, the supervisory process in Canada focuses on banks evaluating the repayment 
capacity of borrowers rather than the adequacy of collateral.  Third, there is obligatory mortgage 
insurance for high LTV mortgages and, finally, Canada applied macroprudential tools during the 
run-up of housing prices between 2008 and 2012. 
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Under the headline “Housing Really Is the Business Cycle”, Leamer (2015a) draws four 
lessons from the recent U.S. crisis.  First, housing drives the business cycle, with nine of the 
eleven U.S. recessions since 1950 preceded by declines in housing. Second, monetary policy 
influences not only the level of house construction, but also its distribution across time. Third, 
the only way to stop a housing bubble is to intervene to prevent the stock from becoming 
excessive, which means raising interest rates when housing starts are above the normal.    
Finally, while previous cycles have been driven by housing volumes, this cycle has been driven 
more by a price cycle, which he attributes to financial innovations.  
Where does the analysis of the recent crisis leave us? Claessens (2015b) picks up some of the 
themes in many of the papers in this special issue.  How can we interpret the current recovery in 
house prices in many crisis countries?  Is this recovery driven by fundamentals or are we 
observing a new bubble? More generally, what are the best ways to reduce the boom and bust 
pattern of housing that has had such adverse consequences for the real economy and financial 
stability?  And what are the appropriate tools to deal with the overhang of a house price bust? To 
answer these questions, we need better price data and better models.  But even with better data, 
can we detect bubbles and know when to prick them? Also, do the same macroprudential tools 
work as well in restraining a boom as they can help a housing market come out of a bust? 
Finally, aside from prudential considerations, there are broader questions about the factors that 
drive the supply and demand for housing finance.  For instance, what should be the relative roles 
of banks, non-banks and markets in providing housing finance?  What is the optimal market 
structure for the housing finance industry?  What is the role of the state beyond prudential 
regulation: should there be increased regulation of the construction sector and the land market?  
Is a predominantly owner-occupied housing market really superior to a rental-dominated one?  
The topics discussed in this introductory chapter and analyzed in detail throughout this 
special issue are of critical importance if societies are to enjoy efficient and stable housing 
finance systems.  The papers in this special issue offer new data, new analysis and new insights 
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